Post by Derek Nahigyan on Jul 21, 2009 0:43:48 GMT -5
Terrorism: To say the least is a complex topic. What justifies murder? War. What justifies war? “1. Just Cause. 2. Right intention. 3. Proper authority and public declaration. 4. Last Resort. 5. Probability of Success. 6. (Macro-) proportionality.” (Brian Orend. 230-231). For these six terms to be ignored is a form of terrorism.
To begin with, was the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki terrorism? No. Wilkins argues on page 266 to 267 that it was an act of war—perhaps unjust (since neither area held weapons for Japan but were indeed civilian areas) but—because they had exhausted all other means to stop them, it was justified. He argues that war is justified when all political and legal remedies have been exhausted and when it is aimed at a collective guilt or terrorist involved. This will be the main means of my presented argument.
Claudia Card takes an extraordinarily strong stance in opposition to the Iraq war. The war on terrorism is no different from the war on crime or drugs. Who are the opponents? “People in uniform are labeled as combatants, except in guerilla warfare.” (254). So what good are the uniforms anyway, for identifying our allies? That’s impossible, since terrorism can come from a U.S. citizen as well. Terrorism is violence against another, in terms of political parties, making everyone involved. A war on terrorism does not give us an enemy like France or Britain, it is abstract, and thusly could be about anything. Card gives a pacifist viewpoint; she doesn’t want war because it deprives the guilty party of a fair trial. And who is guilty? David Luban mentions John Locke and Thomas Hobbes on page 258. He mentions that the Locke’s horizontal contract, is “a contract, by which people bind themselves in a community prior to state.” And Hobbes’s vertical contract is “a contract by which people set a sovereign over them.” In this case, the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is justified because Japan represented a horizontal contract, as did we, and therefore the bombing was aimed at the collective guilt. Now, Lionel K. McPherson argues, “the nature of political obedience absolves even generals of moral responsibility, even in an unjust war. He is a loyal and obedient citizen/subject/servant.” (248). I mention this because then one could argue that the Nazis didn’t deserve to be punished after Hitler’s fall, but their relationship to Adolf Hitler’s reign was one, binding the vertical contract. They chose him to be their leader and therefore, the soldiers were responsible, they did deserve to be punished.
Thomas Nagel says that moral flaws are irrelevant and that “the definition of murdering ‘innocent’ lives means those who are ‘currently harmless’ and it is opposed, not to ‘guilty’ but ‘doing harm.’” (243). McPherson also includes this in his article and it is a good lead in to, what constitutes as unwarranted killing. If a mother is currently harmless, but is harboring several terrorists in her home, is she a viable target? Nagel says no, but McPherson says yes. There are innocent and non-innocent, which means that even a brainwashed soldier, while morally innocent, is still a combatant, and therefore, a target. A lady baking bread for the terrorists to eat is not a combatant but she is non-innocent and, therefore, a target. This supports Claudia Card’s stance on the confusion part of the war, as in, who are our enemies, in the war on terrorism. The complex issue of innocent and non-innocent, as well as combatant and non-combatant are all mixed up, and “innocence and guilt [have become] synonymous with citizen and soldier.” (243). Who are we fighting is the question at hand today. Since we cannot pick a single person, or even a group of people, our reasons for going to war (1-6) have fallen astray, since we cannot say that it follows 1. Just cause. 2. Right intention. 4. Last resort. Or 5. Probability of success. Because the crime of murder is waived during war, it’s hard to determine just what is civilized and what terrorism is. And because of the variables involved, even a currently harmless civilian could be a non-innocent combatant in a moment. Without fair trials, there is no way of finding or identifying our enemies. A lot of terrorism goes unnoticed and when a country (or woman, in the case of Francine Hughes) chooses to fight back, the result is prosecuting the defendant. Who then is at fault—is Card’s concern—the husband; the country that wouldn’t prosecute the brutal husband; or is the woman placed as another example of Thomas Hurka’s upper limit qualification, in that she violated her violator’s rights by not using the least means possible. Because the war on terrorism is not cut and dry, it will always be unjust. And while many war theorists argue that jus ad bellum and jus in bellum are separate from one another, it’s that kind of inconsistency that leads to poor morale and a violation of the horizontal contract.
To begin with, was the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki terrorism? No. Wilkins argues on page 266 to 267 that it was an act of war—perhaps unjust (since neither area held weapons for Japan but were indeed civilian areas) but—because they had exhausted all other means to stop them, it was justified. He argues that war is justified when all political and legal remedies have been exhausted and when it is aimed at a collective guilt or terrorist involved. This will be the main means of my presented argument.
Claudia Card takes an extraordinarily strong stance in opposition to the Iraq war. The war on terrorism is no different from the war on crime or drugs. Who are the opponents? “People in uniform are labeled as combatants, except in guerilla warfare.” (254). So what good are the uniforms anyway, for identifying our allies? That’s impossible, since terrorism can come from a U.S. citizen as well. Terrorism is violence against another, in terms of political parties, making everyone involved. A war on terrorism does not give us an enemy like France or Britain, it is abstract, and thusly could be about anything. Card gives a pacifist viewpoint; she doesn’t want war because it deprives the guilty party of a fair trial. And who is guilty? David Luban mentions John Locke and Thomas Hobbes on page 258. He mentions that the Locke’s horizontal contract, is “a contract, by which people bind themselves in a community prior to state.” And Hobbes’s vertical contract is “a contract by which people set a sovereign over them.” In this case, the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is justified because Japan represented a horizontal contract, as did we, and therefore the bombing was aimed at the collective guilt. Now, Lionel K. McPherson argues, “the nature of political obedience absolves even generals of moral responsibility, even in an unjust war. He is a loyal and obedient citizen/subject/servant.” (248). I mention this because then one could argue that the Nazis didn’t deserve to be punished after Hitler’s fall, but their relationship to Adolf Hitler’s reign was one, binding the vertical contract. They chose him to be their leader and therefore, the soldiers were responsible, they did deserve to be punished.
Thomas Nagel says that moral flaws are irrelevant and that “the definition of murdering ‘innocent’ lives means those who are ‘currently harmless’ and it is opposed, not to ‘guilty’ but ‘doing harm.’” (243). McPherson also includes this in his article and it is a good lead in to, what constitutes as unwarranted killing. If a mother is currently harmless, but is harboring several terrorists in her home, is she a viable target? Nagel says no, but McPherson says yes. There are innocent and non-innocent, which means that even a brainwashed soldier, while morally innocent, is still a combatant, and therefore, a target. A lady baking bread for the terrorists to eat is not a combatant but she is non-innocent and, therefore, a target. This supports Claudia Card’s stance on the confusion part of the war, as in, who are our enemies, in the war on terrorism. The complex issue of innocent and non-innocent, as well as combatant and non-combatant are all mixed up, and “innocence and guilt [have become] synonymous with citizen and soldier.” (243). Who are we fighting is the question at hand today. Since we cannot pick a single person, or even a group of people, our reasons for going to war (1-6) have fallen astray, since we cannot say that it follows 1. Just cause. 2. Right intention. 4. Last resort. Or 5. Probability of success. Because the crime of murder is waived during war, it’s hard to determine just what is civilized and what terrorism is. And because of the variables involved, even a currently harmless civilian could be a non-innocent combatant in a moment. Without fair trials, there is no way of finding or identifying our enemies. A lot of terrorism goes unnoticed and when a country (or woman, in the case of Francine Hughes) chooses to fight back, the result is prosecuting the defendant. Who then is at fault—is Card’s concern—the husband; the country that wouldn’t prosecute the brutal husband; or is the woman placed as another example of Thomas Hurka’s upper limit qualification, in that she violated her violator’s rights by not using the least means possible. Because the war on terrorism is not cut and dry, it will always be unjust. And while many war theorists argue that jus ad bellum and jus in bellum are separate from one another, it’s that kind of inconsistency that leads to poor morale and a violation of the horizontal contract.