Post by Derek Nahigyan on Jul 21, 2009 0:46:12 GMT -5
The ‘famine debate’: Are we morally obligated to support starving nations? Peter Singer would say yes. He uses a baby face down in a puddle as a metaphor for starving orphans are third-world countries; to not help the baby out of the puddle, when the sacrifice is simply mud on your suit, is morally wrong.
Peter Singer’s main argument is, “give as much as possible, at least up to the point at which by giving more, one would begin to cause serious suffering for oneself and ones’ dependents.” (349). Singer says that you should donate all that you can without giving anything up in return. So, to buying clothes for instance; if you buy clothes because your old ones are filled with holes and worn beyond repair, then you should purchase clothing because you need to stay warm; if however, you purchase clothing because you want to look particularly fashionable, then that should be considered morally wrong and you should be forced to donate to a charity. What Singer wants is to have our definition of ‘enough’ to go back to the way it was in older times. He wants a less material world since we don’t need a television in every room, and we don’t need to see a movie every Friday night when children are starving next door. “If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without sacrificing anything else morally significant, we ought to do it.” (349). Peter Singer fervently argues that donating to charity is praised while those who don’t donate are not condemned. This distinction means we do not have to do it, it is simply extra; Peter says this is not extra. We need to be donating because it’s a matter of duty, not charity. If people depend on their government to solve this dilemma because they feel as though they are not at fault, “the absurdity that numbers lessens obligation,” (348) then the government will do nothing, since they only act when the people ask them to act. If no one is donating because they expect the government to take care of it, they won’t since they believe that the people don’t care—otherwise they would be donating. Not helping the baby out of the puddle is morally wrong, and a person should be condemned for doing so, Singer wants to make the dividing line between charity and what is mandatory.
John Arthur does not believe this to be the case. He argues promptly with Thomas Jefferson by stating that all men are created equal. “Equality in the sense that it does not require equal distribution of the necessities of life, only that it not interfere with one another, allowing every person the liberty to pursue his own affairs.” (354). The argument is the best rebuttal to Singer’s; while it is within our power to save these poor nations and starving children, it may not be in our best interest. We may, as a people, prefer to seek adulation by other means, but that shouldn’t make it mandatory. “People would rather do things besides work, but know they must to have nice things for their family,” Arthur argues, “this is the incentive to work.” (361). this claim is further backed by James Rachel in saying that proximity plays a huge role. If you pick up that child in the puddle, you can see its effect, but to donate to nations far away is a blind bid. Furthermore, Arthur continues to propose that it is not solely our duty to pick up the drowning child. Whoever left the baby there to begin with is at fault, not solely us as a people. In terms of buying clothes beyond what we need to survive, it’s true that without a nice suit, one would be looked down upon in a job interview, or even around the work place. Arthur says that to give until it causes a substantial impact on yourself is a trifling rule since you can donate a kidney without it affecting you immediately. Does it save someone’s life? Yes, but you are not morally obligated to do it. The kidney is yours. Likewise, the money is yours. The incentive for working is that you get to keep what you earned. Arthur concedes that if the sacrifice is dirtying one’s suit to save a baby’s life, then yes, you are morally obligated to do it. However, the question about money then is irrelevant, since at most, you need to take your suit to be dry-cleaned. He says that if everyone had to donate ten bucks, then that too would be trivial, but we know much more is required and many people wouldn’t do it. Making charity mandatory can only lead to one of three things: 1. Create guilt. 2. Conflict between those who did donate and those who didn’t. or 3. Praise for those who did, and respect for those that didn’t. Given our society and history, three does not seem like a likely candidate. This would cause a great deal of hostility in our society; also, the third option seems like the way things are arranged now, where praise is dealt to those that do donate (can donate) and it’s not an issue for those that don’t. To serve everyone universally, as James Rachel quotes the Confucians, “is to be out of touch with moral reality.” (367). Quite matter of fact, you cannot put another child before your own; you cannot put a third world country ahead of your own family; and your personal interests are protected so long as they don’t involve a violation of someone else’s rights.
Peter Singer’s main argument is, “give as much as possible, at least up to the point at which by giving more, one would begin to cause serious suffering for oneself and ones’ dependents.” (349). Singer says that you should donate all that you can without giving anything up in return. So, to buying clothes for instance; if you buy clothes because your old ones are filled with holes and worn beyond repair, then you should purchase clothing because you need to stay warm; if however, you purchase clothing because you want to look particularly fashionable, then that should be considered morally wrong and you should be forced to donate to a charity. What Singer wants is to have our definition of ‘enough’ to go back to the way it was in older times. He wants a less material world since we don’t need a television in every room, and we don’t need to see a movie every Friday night when children are starving next door. “If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without sacrificing anything else morally significant, we ought to do it.” (349). Peter Singer fervently argues that donating to charity is praised while those who don’t donate are not condemned. This distinction means we do not have to do it, it is simply extra; Peter says this is not extra. We need to be donating because it’s a matter of duty, not charity. If people depend on their government to solve this dilemma because they feel as though they are not at fault, “the absurdity that numbers lessens obligation,” (348) then the government will do nothing, since they only act when the people ask them to act. If no one is donating because they expect the government to take care of it, they won’t since they believe that the people don’t care—otherwise they would be donating. Not helping the baby out of the puddle is morally wrong, and a person should be condemned for doing so, Singer wants to make the dividing line between charity and what is mandatory.
John Arthur does not believe this to be the case. He argues promptly with Thomas Jefferson by stating that all men are created equal. “Equality in the sense that it does not require equal distribution of the necessities of life, only that it not interfere with one another, allowing every person the liberty to pursue his own affairs.” (354). The argument is the best rebuttal to Singer’s; while it is within our power to save these poor nations and starving children, it may not be in our best interest. We may, as a people, prefer to seek adulation by other means, but that shouldn’t make it mandatory. “People would rather do things besides work, but know they must to have nice things for their family,” Arthur argues, “this is the incentive to work.” (361). this claim is further backed by James Rachel in saying that proximity plays a huge role. If you pick up that child in the puddle, you can see its effect, but to donate to nations far away is a blind bid. Furthermore, Arthur continues to propose that it is not solely our duty to pick up the drowning child. Whoever left the baby there to begin with is at fault, not solely us as a people. In terms of buying clothes beyond what we need to survive, it’s true that without a nice suit, one would be looked down upon in a job interview, or even around the work place. Arthur says that to give until it causes a substantial impact on yourself is a trifling rule since you can donate a kidney without it affecting you immediately. Does it save someone’s life? Yes, but you are not morally obligated to do it. The kidney is yours. Likewise, the money is yours. The incentive for working is that you get to keep what you earned. Arthur concedes that if the sacrifice is dirtying one’s suit to save a baby’s life, then yes, you are morally obligated to do it. However, the question about money then is irrelevant, since at most, you need to take your suit to be dry-cleaned. He says that if everyone had to donate ten bucks, then that too would be trivial, but we know much more is required and many people wouldn’t do it. Making charity mandatory can only lead to one of three things: 1. Create guilt. 2. Conflict between those who did donate and those who didn’t. or 3. Praise for those who did, and respect for those that didn’t. Given our society and history, three does not seem like a likely candidate. This would cause a great deal of hostility in our society; also, the third option seems like the way things are arranged now, where praise is dealt to those that do donate (can donate) and it’s not an issue for those that don’t. To serve everyone universally, as James Rachel quotes the Confucians, “is to be out of touch with moral reality.” (367). Quite matter of fact, you cannot put another child before your own; you cannot put a third world country ahead of your own family; and your personal interests are protected so long as they don’t involve a violation of someone else’s rights.
